> The irony of prediction markets is that they are supposed to be a more trustworthy way of gleaning the future than internet clickbait and half-baked punditry, but they risk shredding whatever shared trust we still have left. The suspiciously well-timed bets that one Polymarket user placed right before the capture of Nicolás Maduro may have been just a stroke of phenomenal luck that netted a roughly $400,000 payout. Or maybe someone with inside information was looking for easy money.
I'm trying to understand what the criticism is here, because the example seems to support the point that these are meant to be a way of learning the future, not oppose it. I thought the whole point was that yes, people with inside knowledge will bet large sums of money on things they expect to happen, and that's what makes the prediction useful. The market is meant to incentivize people who know things to act on them in a way that makes them known.
If I knew someone wanted me dead, of course I would want a prediction market on it, and if the odds suddenly shifted dramatically in favor of my death, I would use that as a trigger for whatever defense strategies I had in place. Someone has really good reason to bet a lot of money on the prospect that I'm about to die. It's probably someone who knows of an active plot in motion to try to kill me! The sooner I can find out about that, the better. I would much rather give them an incentive to make that known somewhat earlier than wait.
I feel like there must be some big piece of this puzzle that I'm missing that makes it so these cannot operate the way I imagine them, but I haven't heard anyone explaining what it is. Someone fill me in on what I'm missing here?
If the prediction market is for a non-trivial amount, it's likely someone is going to kill you in exchange for the money the prediction market offered them. The prediction market isn't acting as a prophet here, it's acting as a plausibly deniable murder for hire service and you are its victim.
The people "betting against" you dying just paid to have you killed.
Exactly, these markets exist in the real world, so as their size and use increases, the more likely the odds will influence real world events. Look at sports betting for a much smaller example. Match fixing is known. Electricity markets are gamed for individual profits at the detriment to everyone and the stability of the system, even with regulators trying to keep things stable. Enough "Market for all the things" already..
See, there are two major flavours of pro-market attitudes. The first one is "if we allow many independent individuals to try their own approaches to a problem and let the people with "better" approach to personally profit from it handsomely and make them compete against each other in an environment with objective-ish judgement of "what is better" instead of "impress the (inevitably corruptible) officials to be judged victorious and awarded the fortunes", and also manually guard and regulate against several universally known ways to sabotage such competition, then we'll be able to channel human ingenuity into solving difficult to solve technical problems while also rewarding those who are able to come up with (and implement) such solutions with low overseeing overhead". Of course, such an attitude isn't strictly speaking "pro-market", it's been around since ancient times; hell, the USSR of all places had this attitude in spades until about the 70s or so.
The second one is "Nah, we don't have to try and think about anything ourselves, just let people fend for themselves, they'll figure it out, and it won't have any unforeseen bad side effects, why would it; markets are magical like that!" Yeah, about that...
Right, a market is a small tool of larger systems. That’s fine, hard to get right but can make systems better. Type two just seems to be the cargo culted everywhere..
I think it's actually not that hard to get right (or at least "right enough"), as evidenced by the fact that markets have successfully run the entire global economy for thousands of years with no central oversight and almost no regulation.
Markets failures do happen, and when they do it can be helpful to have an external force step in to nudge the market back onto the rails. But even without such interventions they work remarkably well on balance.
> markets have successfully run the entire global economy for thousands of years
Markets, as they are understood today, are more like about 300 years old, even less in some places. The bulk of world economy has been sustenance farming for most of the human history, with some communal mutual help (based on favours and mutual indebtedness) thrown in.
> with no central oversight and almost no regulation
Lol what? E.g. Roman Republic (and later empire) tightly regulated its markets, especially food trade, during all of its existence.
The industrial revolution multiplied the size of the global economy by several orders of magnitude, but it didn't create it. International trade has been happening on a smaller scale since large-scale civilized society existed. And I said "almost no regulation", not "no regulation". Probably something on the order of 99% of the regulations we have today wouldn't have even been feasible to enforce a couple hundred years ago, yet markets still functioned just fine on the whole.
The type of people who have the power to change decide these type of events already are able to use that power to make money in a thousand different ways. These markets will change nothing.
This was discussed on polymarket with the Galve Goat burning bet and assume it's why
Essentially it's a big straw goat in Sweden that vandals sometime set on fire.
Right towards the end as the probability approaches zero there's a huge profit incentive, "done deals" usually go under well under 1¢ meaning 100-200x returns.
A US man once traveled to Sweden to set the goat on fire, he was caught, fined $20k(?) and then fled the country before paying the fine.
Risk reward in a situation like this absolutely creates a situation for prediction markets similar to the observer effect in physics, it's no longer predicting the future and instead altering it.
As it gets closer to the deadline, the timeframe shortens, so the gain does increase. A 1% return which you're paid on tomorrow is a 3,778% annualized return.
There’s still limited liquidity. You need to find someone willing to put up a very large amount of money for almost no gain. I also doubt these websites have enough activity to well calibrate near 1 dollar bets, so it’s not clear the market is giving you accurate predictive power with very expensive bets, which means you’re risking a lot (again, for almost no gain).
Yes, OOP might have chosen a suboptimal example here. But for general newsworthy events, people aren’t going to be in positions to manually make them happen. And no person in a position to start a war would do it to affect a Polymarket bet.
The prediction markets aren't yet at sufficient scale to purchase a war, you mean. People start wars for money all the time though. If they become of sufficient scale, people will purchase wars on them.
There's already lots of examples where they are of sufficient scale, like paying the press secretary to shut up after 64 minutes. Or paying someone to falsify ISWs map of the front line in Ukraine.
> But for general newsworthy events, people aren’t going to be in positions to manually make them happen.
Many newsworthy events (and even more events that actually reach prediction markets, many of which are at best marginally newsworthy) are actions ultimately pivot on a human decision, so the first part isn’t true.
> And no person in a position to start a war would do it to affect a Polymarket bet.
Are you saying “no one would start a war with personal financial gain being part of the motivation”, or “it is impossible for the payoff of a prediction market bet to be of sufficient magnitude to alter the calculus in even the tiniest iota in that case”?
Because the first seems extremely clearly false, and the second seems improbable in the case where the first is false.
> And no person in a position to start a war would do it to affect a Polymarket bet.
Are you fucking kidding? Based just on current events, that is absolutely not a statement you can make without at least trying to prove it.
If you do try to prove that you will fail as the idea that people would start wars for profit is as old as wars.
Just evaluate the sentence you've just created. How many people exist who have the capability to start wars or influence the start of wars? It's a lot. What else do you know about these people and their motivations?
It isn’t just the people who can start a war. It’s also normal people who can.
Imagine if 10 million people bet on starting a war vs 5 million who say no war. Those net 5 million people are going on social media saying why the war is justified. They’ll vote in war mongers. They’ll support the military. The bet literally influences the result. It’s a self fulfilling prophecy.
I can see someone in the Trump admin absolutely using a betting market when they can influence the outcome. At the least I'd also bet that someone in the T admin was the person who knew about Maduro being captured.
...but many people in positions where they can start a war or cause some other highly visible event of any sort probably will start turning to Polymarket to make money in the course of their work
Not really, for the same reason entrapment isn't usually seen as an accurate way to gather information for law enforcement. See also Goodhart's law and overfitting.
It's not a bounty, though, right? It operates like other trading markets? So unless they have big money to wager, they don't have big money to gain. If it's hovering at, say, 10% odds, it's not like they can automatically 10x their money because other people have to take the opposite side. There would have to be a lot of liquidity in the market for their large bet not to move the odds, and as the odds move, they make less money.
> So unless they have big money to wager, they don't have big money to gain.
It requires that they put down collateral (the purchase of the the yes bets) that they lose if they don't meet the contract, so they do have to have starting capital.
> because other people have to take the opposite side.
That is to say that there must be people offering the bounty.
The size of the bounty isn't defined by the price of the contract, but the total upside available in the order book.
> and as the odds move, they make less money.
They have to put up more collateral for the remainder of the contract if they want that upside - but they make all the money that they already put up collateral for.
> The size of the bounty isn't defined by the price of the contract, but the total upside available in the order book.
But one person doesn't get the whole thing. ALL the people holding that side of the contract split the payout, in proportion to the size of their holdings in that side of the market.
I think if I use hypothetical numbers, it will help me explain how I think it works, and maybe this will help someone figure out where my error is.
Let's imagine the market is about whether I will die by the end of the day. So far, there are $500,000 in total bets in the market, and there are 5,000 shares in this market. Let's say it's currently sitting at only 10% odds that I'm going to die. I think that means 4,500 shares, or $450,000, is on the "No" side and 500 shares, or $50,000 is on the "Yes" side. Do I have that right so far?
If nothing changes about the market and I'm still alive at the end of the day, everyone who holds a "No" share splits the $500,000 pot, correct? There are 4,500 of them, so they each get $111.11 per share.
But suppose someone has a solid plan to kill me by the end of the day. They decide they want to dump $50,000 in on the "Yes" side. That's not going to buy them 500 shares, because they would need someone willing to sell 500 shares at the current price. They'll actually get well under 500 shares, and probably not even half that many, and they'll still be splitting the pot among the other people who already have the 500 shares on the "Yes" side. So they're still at not even half the "Yes" side of the market. They can probably double or triple their money, but we're talking about making another $50-100k on top of getting their own $50k back. It's not like they get the whole $500k.
That's what I mean when I say it's "not a bounty." A "bounty" makes it sound like, "If you're the one who kills smeej, you get $500k," but that's not what's happening here.
Lots of people might be willing to try to kill me for $500k. A heck of a lot fewer are going to be willing to try to kill me for 2-3x whatever capital they can come up with right before the hit.
Am I at least understanding this part of it correctly, how the payouts actually work? If I'm not, that would go a long way toward helping me figure out what I'm missing.
> I think that means 4,500 shares, or $450,000, is on the "No" side and 500 shares, or $50,000 is on the "Yes" side. Do I have that right so far?
No - there's always an equal number of contract outstanding on both sides of the bet. A contract is a promise from the person who sold "no" to pay the person who bought "yes" a dollar if the outcome happens. These contracts can trade from anywhere between 1 cent to 99 cents corresponding to a 1% chance to a 99% chance that you would die*. The odds the market reports is just whatever price the last contract traded at (or alternatively whatever price sits between the current open offers to buy/sell contracts. In liquid markets these tend to be the same).
> If nothing changes about the market and I'm still alive at the end of the day, everyone who holds a "No" share splits the $500,000 pot, correct? There are 4,500 of them, so they each get $111.11 per share.
They each get $1 per share. Their profit is $1 minus how much they paid for the share. It's not (meaningfully) a shared pot which is divided up, it's a fixed amount per share.
> They decide they want to dump $50,000 in on the "Yes" side. That's not going to buy them 500 shares, because they would need someone willing to sell 500 shares at the current price.
Ignoring the numbers at this point - you're generally right that they need to find someone willing to sell them the contracts. The existence of a large number of outstanding contracts doesn't guarantee this - they might be held by someone who is holding them to minimize the payout a hitman could get for killing you for instance.
The most direct guarantee is the order book The order book is the collection of open offers "I'm willing to sell X yes-contracts at Y price" that the market has for potential purchasers. The hitman can look at this and snatch up all of these simultaneously (up to some race conditions in the market - we can mostly pretend those don't exist but they do introduce some risk on the hitmans side). This can be thought of as the size of the currently available bounty.
There's a chance the market will continually over-price these yes contracts - and the hitman will never kill you as a result. That would be a huge mistake on all the financially motivated holders of yes contracts though - their positions go from worth something (if they sell to the aspiring hitman) to worth nothing if they don't price them low enough. In general you should expect the market to find the price at which a hitman will carry out the contract - so long as there's enough money in the market in the first place.
* Ignoring transaction fees and the time value of money, it's close enough for this discussion.
But the hitman still does not get the entire value of the contract. The hitman gets the value of the number of shares he can afford to buy, but that's not the whole contract by any means.
I think I understand what you're saying about the pricing. Am I correct in saying, then, that if the odds are 90% in favor of my living through the contract, the "No, smeej won't die today" price should be close to $0.10 (again, ignoring fees and the time value of money)?
If the hitman tries to buy in with 10% of the total funds already in the market, the odds/price are going to shift hard. It's going to devour a huge chunk of the order book. Any market that suddenly has someone come in at 10% of the whole market value is going to get a massive trading wick. So yeah, he'd get some shares at $0.10, but he's probably going to eat the open order book to a much higher cost. He can 10x some very small portion of his money (however many shares are on the book at $0.10), but he can only 5x his money at $0.20, or 3x at $0.33.
Even if we assume he does have $50k to dump into the market, I still don't see how he's going to more than triple his money, which is a heck of a lot less than taking the entire market's value as though it were a bounty.
For a few shares, sure, but not if you come in at 10% of the whole market in volume. That would eat a huge chunk of the open order book, causing a massive trading wick. You can't buy very many shares at that 9x value.
Yes - we agree on how the pricing and odds work now :)
The hitman shouldn't expect to capture the value of the entire open interest. The market here is serving to negotiate the bounty with speculators betting that too much was offered taking the rest (a privilege they pay for by buying contracts that only pay out if they don't take too much). It's a curious form of negotiation since the people paying for the murder don't participate... but should (in a very theoretical efficient market) come to a "fair" (large enough to get the job done, and no larger) payment for the hitman.
2xing your money in a night is a huge payout, I think you're overestimating how high the multiplier on the capital requirement needs to be. That said, if you aren't, and you need a 5x payout to find a hitman then no rational speculator would purchase contracts for more then $0.20...
It's only a huge payout if you have a huge amount of money. If you have $1k to put in, you get $2k out. Who's risking getting caught and potentially facing the death penalty for $1k in profit?
If someone already has significant money backing, and especially if that person already has some other specific reason to want you dead, I can see how it might be added incentive, but even so, you also now have to tip your hand. To buy in hard, you have to send a signal saying you have reason to be confident I'm about to die. You're basically shooting yourself in the foot right before trying to shoot me in the head.
Plus, it's not like the markets are anonymous. Polymarket isn't trading with Monero. You're not just tipping your hand ahead of time. You're pointing the investigators right at yourself.
I just don't see how the calculations end up falling in favor of killing somebody if you weren't already planning to do so.
OK so its much a shallower thought than I anticipated.
Why go through the "prediction market" at all then? The hitman still killed someone, payments are not anonymous in this market, and its certainly not clean. Further, you share the pot with however many are involved, proportional to the allotted bets on each side and presuming binary prediction. And if the winds change on the market for the bet proportional to the "hitman's" side, you lose out on dollars that would otherwise be paid to you (the hitman).
And it'd be so easy to stiff the hitman just by equalizing the positions by timing it.
All that risk for something that's far simpler to just pay directly?
> Why go through the "prediction market" at all then
It's there. It's not actually easy to find hitman for hire. This is a publicly advertised market for it.
Plausible deniability. We weren't paying for the witness to be murdered, we were expressing our confidence that no one would murder the witness.
Price discovery. The market tells you how much you need to pay a hitman (if you overpay hedge funds swoop in and take the difference, telling you for next time. If the hedge funds underestimate the cost they end up paying a significant penalty to the people who they prevented from hiring a hitman).
Crowd funding. The market means that every can chip in however much they want towards paying the hitman, and they only end up paying if its enough. In fact the middlemen who accepted the bets in the meantime may promise to pay some small amount of damages if enough isn't collected.
It is impossible to stiff the hitman, and there is no risk for the hitman that the "winds change". The hitman takes out the entire "yes" position before committing the murder. If it's not enough, they don't commit the murder.
> I'm trying to understand what the criticism is here
You're correct in your understanding of prediction markets with respect to traders using insider information. There are a couple things going on here. One is the subtext from most news media now that Technology Bad. New technologies are treated as guilty until proven innocent, because that is a more engaging narrative for readers. So in this case, those covering this stuff immediately latch onto the rich get richer, insider trading viewpoint, and that gets reported without any analysis of why that might actually be desirable.
Second, prediction markets, in trying to become broadly accessible to "normal" people and desiring liquidity, need a marketing strategy that is understandable. They can't put out a Robin Hanson article as marketing material. So they market by appealing to something people do already understand, which is gambling. The public has this idea now of prediction markets as a way to make money, not as a tool for learning information. So the default perspective on insider trading is now one of unfairness: somebody used their privileged position to make money. The correct perspective is, in fact, that prediction markets are providing users with value by eliciting information from those insiders, information that the public would not otherwise have. The latter perspective is mostly foreign to degenerate gamblers, and the marketing campaigns of Kalshi and Polymarket aren't helping.
I don't think it's so easy to get true information out of all the noise in the markets, and in any case, I don't see how this helps with the fact that corruption is bad. So what if I learn that a country will be wrongfully invaded? Can I have someone impeached for it?
The missing piece is the distinction between a market that observes reality and a market that instigates it.
The criticism is about the systemic risk of converting prediction markets into "Assassination Markets"—mechanisms where the payout is not a reward for foresight, but a bounty for action.
In the case of Maduro, the operation cost around $300 million so a $400,000 payout isn’t providing a financial incentive.
But in the case of assassination, a $400,000 payout is sufficient motivation.
Or if you're the military commander with the option to disobey the illegal order (to go to war without congressional authorization) or take the bribe and execute the order. "Unmarked cash" (which this is) has pretty different purposes from official funds.
I think there's a pretty good chance the person who took that money was opportunistic, this time, but $400k isn't a trivial sum of money, it's not impossible it was the difference between this happening and not.
But it's not a bounty. It's a market, right? So the payout is split among everyone on your side? And the if you try to dump a ton (measured relative to the size of the market) into the market, the price tanks because there aren't enough people coming in on the other side. You get a big wick in the trading candle, so you scoop up the much less favorable terms of the bet at higher cost.
> I'm trying to understand what the criticism is here, because the example seems to support the point that these are meant to be a way of learning the future, not oppose it. I thought the whole point was that yes, people with inside knowledge will bet large sums of money on things they expect to happen, and that's what makes the prediction useful. The market is meant to incentivize people who know things to act on them in a way that makes them known.
Except the paragraph you quoted nullify this benefit
> The suspiciously well-timed bets that one Polymarket user placed right before the capture of Nicolás Maduro
So we learnt nothing. For the entire duration the stock is online, its pretty much 50/50 then suddenly 1 day before, the ticker spikes to yes.
Yes, but it spikes BEFORE the attack begins, which means we learnt someone thought there was a string reason to believe things were about to change earlier than we otherwise would have.
That's the whole point, isn't it?
And if you're going to tell me the paragraph I quoted nullifies what I've said, would you please explain how? Obviously I don't currently understand it the same way you do, and I have asked for help understanding what I'm missing. Saying, "You're missing it," isn't helpful.
> I'm trying to understand what the criticism is here, because the example seems to support the point that these are meant to be a way of learning the future, not oppose it.
Indeed. Insider trading is a feature of prediction markets, not a bug. There are two kinds of people who participate in prediction markets:
1. People who have insider information, or at least more sophisticated predictive capability than your average person.
2. Gamblers.
In effect, prediction markets are a way to move wealth from the second group to the first. If you understand that and still want to participate, cool. It's your money, and you're allowed to gamble it away if you find that entertaining.
At any rate, given the relatively small-potatoes level of bets going on at Polymarket and Kalshi, the article author's breathless anxiety about this is a bit overblown.
> 1. People who have insider information, or at least more sophisticated predictive capability than your average person.
This bucket as you've defined it is too broad.
There are a few different kinds of non-gambler participants in prediction markets:
1. People with "insider information" as we think of it - they "know" the answer to the market because they are "involved" somehow.
2. People who aim to do superior analysis of publicly available information to produce an edge. For example, an AI firm with better hurricane prediction modeling may try to monetize that by betting on whether or not a hurricane will impact an area.
2b. People who do the work to create new information. For example, the Trump 2024 election market on polymarket famously had better odds for Trump than polling. It turned out that a mega whale was bidding Trump up because he had paid for his own private polling in battleground states and that gave him confidence Trump was going to win.
In short, it's mostly incorrect to suggest that prediction market participants are either illegitimate insiders or gamblers; there is a third class of actors that are a very important cohort: those who do the work to create better predictions and monetize their work by betting in the markets. This third cohort of professional predictors is the most important in long-term prediction market growth.
Kalshi and Polymarket have a billion dollar of open interest between them (though velocity here matters too and volume is not very useful). The important thing is they are growing fast. Which means it might become big-potatoes very soon.
Insider trading in stocks are prohibited but not for the reason most people think. It has nothing to do with someone having an unfair advantage in an informational sense, and everything to do with fiduciary responsibility.
The CEO and executive team has fiduciary responsibility to act in the financial best interest of the shareholders. Your broker too.
If you have insider info (Obtained legally) but no fiduciary responsibility you can act on it. That’s why congress members trading US equities based on decisions they’re privy to is not, from a legal perspective, insider trading. They don’t have a fiduciary responsibility to their constituents
1. The misappropriation theory of insider trading covers anyone who trades on material non public information sourced through a trusted relationship regardless of any fiduciary duty to the company. For example, if I tell my personal attorney a non public fact about the company I work at, and they trade on that information, they absolutely can be found guilty of insider trading despite having no relationship to the company at hand.
2. Congress is explicitly covered by insider trading law, which was affirmed in the STOCK Act of 2012. The fact that they’re rarely indicted has more to do with the legal and political challenges associated with doing so, not the legality of the act.
> The misappropriation theory of insider trading covers anyone who trades on material non public information sourced through a trusted relationship regardless of any fiduciary duty to the company. For example, if I tell my personal attorney a non public fact about the company I work at, and they trade on that information, they absolutely can be found guilty of insider trading despite having no relationship to the company at hand.
Huh. The lawyer example works because attorneys have a very specific, enforceable duty of confidentiality. Swap that relationship out and the conclusion may change. As written, the comment slides from "duty-based misuse of information" to "any private knowledge you shouldn’t have," which is not the same thing.
A lawyer (not my lawyer) gave me his off-the-cuff opinion on this scenario:
A pharmacologically-literate clinical trial participant for a novel new drug strongly suspects he did not receive the placebo/comparator drug, based on the subjective effects, plus their own pharmacology knowledge, experience with the placebo, and the research on the candidate drug.
However, this drug was not therapeutic for him, the side effects were onerous, or perhaps he believes the trial will be halted. Whatever their reasoning behind his inference, no details of others’ experiences were leaked to him, blinding was maintained; protocol was followed. He didn’t base this on a lab readout.
Based on his understanding of published research on the candidate drug, and projecting from his lived experience as lab rat, he believes this trial should disappoint shareholders. At the very least, shares may be priced too high.
Can the participant, based on this inference, invest $$$ shorting the pharma firm? This drug is considered the firm’s last best hope.
Their answer was yes, basically. He can trade on this non-public info.
This scenario seems very different because nobody gave the person any material non-public information at all, they simply deduced it from their experience participating in the trial. This feels similar to the question of "can a passenger on the Boeing jet with the door plug that blew out trade on that information" to which the answer appears to be yes.
Misappropriation theory is the following:
> The misappropriation theory of insider trading is a form of insider trading where an individual trades stock in a corporation, with whom they are unaffiliated, on the basis of material non-public information they obtained through a breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the source of the information
The important part, which you're right was unclear in my comment is that the recipient of the information must have a fiduciary relationship with the source of the information, even if they do not have one with the company in question at all. That's the distinction.
> I'm trying to understand what the criticism is here, because the example seems to support the point that these are meant to be a way of learning the future, not oppose it. I thought the whole point was that yes, people with inside knowledge will bet large sums of money on things they expect to happen, and that's what makes the prediction useful. The market is meant to incentivize people who know things to act on them in a way that makes them known.
You're ignoring the critical issue of timing. It's one thing to crowd-source knowledge in a steady, homogenous way. It's quite another for an actor with material knowledge of the situation to exploit this dramatic information asymmetry to turn a profit, revealing the new information at the last possible timepoint it could be used to lay a wager. Insider trading is quite different from a Hayek-style price signalling, and it's the same here. In principle (and on long time-scales) these markets can incentivize important information to come to light sure, but in infinite time we're all dead anyways. The short-time dynamics matter a lot more, from a social welfare perspective.
>If I knew someone wanted me dead, of course I would want a prediction market on it [...] Someone fill me in on what I'm missing here?
The assassin might place the bet at roughly the same time as they place the bullet in the chamber. Making the prediction into a bounty. Not giving you any meaningful time to ponder the new information. The notification from your phone would be the distraction they'd use when taking aim.
> I'm trying to understand what the criticism is here
> If I knew someone wanted me dead, of course I would want a prediction market on it, and if the odds suddenly shifted dramatically in favor of my death
No, you definitely would not want that. You don't want to live in the world like this. That's the point.
It's fucking horrible and dystopian, people betting on extra-legal invasions of countries, murders, things that could hurt or harm people where they have incentives to do something else that you've just distorted.
Gambling has been illegal, immoral, and proscribed by religions for literally thousands of years, in all sorts of different forms and iterations, for a reason. Because it's incredibly toxic to society.
You can make some arguments that pure games of chance, like casino games, and even maybe sports betting (since sports is a spectacle) aren't that bad. Based on what we've seen recently, I tend to disagree, but at least it's an argument.
But now we're talking about betting on all sorts of political issues, things that are illegal, things where people are acting in an official capacity and shouldn't be given incentives to subvert that. And all these other examples are just bad. There's not really any upside to this at all. It's just bad for society and it shouldn't happen. It's horrible.
If you feel like you're missing a big piece of the puzzle you should take a couple of steps back and think about the consequences of a world where this is common.
I think easy gambling over the internet is terrible, tons of young people are getting stuck in it. People get addicted to it throughout history and ruin their lives, vulnerable people get in trouble with huge losses.
But I don't think we should do anything because religion doesn't like it - that's a foolish thing to use to make your crucial choices or world view. A key reason is pretty much every terrible thing ever was excused as requirement of some religion or forever. Separate from the hurtful things in religious books at times, it's too easy for leaders or authorities to somehow justify actions.
Let's instead use a goal of treating each other respectfully, stop hating and killing each other. Yeah, that's all naive stuff, we aren't there, maybe we'll never be there. Still a good goal, treat each other with kindness. And yeah, I'm an optimistic sort.
You have cause and effect backwards. I'm saying that it's horrible and toxic for society which is why almost every major religion over every major period of history noticed and banned it.
It's not toxic because religion doesn't like it. Religion doesn't like it because it's toxic.
Religion has been the primary means throughout history by which humans have tried to figure out right and wrong. You can feel however you want about it, but that's just how it's worked. It's basically the ultimate example of Chesterton's fence.
To carry my analogy further, there are many, many, many times where the fence doesn't need to be there or where the fence has outlived its useful purpose. But it's still a good metaphor.
I think the problem is that I don't think it would end up primarily being about gambling.
I already live in a world where people make odds about whether I'm going to die. They're called "actuaries," and they work at life insurance companies. There are also oddsmakers of the same kind at car insurance companies, etc.
Right now, I hate that people who can actually analyze enough data to make odds about these things can only earn a living working for companies that are incentivized to find ways not to pay out when the odds do break against them. I'd much rather these people be able to make their livings just calculating odds, placing bets, and being right. I would like to have access to their calculations, and not be in a position of "just take it or leave it" when I'm evaluating a prospective plan from a life insurance company, for example.
Yes, by all means, there will be gamblers in these markets. There will always be some amount of noise, just like there is in the stock market. But why would that end up being the bulk of the industry? Just like with Wall Street, I would expect companies to grow up around these markets that specialize in getting the odds of things right, and making money off of their predictions. If the market ever became truly efficient, I think we would have a MUCH better idea than we do now about the likelihood of all kinds of things.
Heck, even if I think of something as apparently mundane as weather forecasting, if somebody came up with a breakout model that was right substantially more often, I would expect they would be able to raise all sorts of capital around it and start winning in all the weather forecasting markets, which would then make their predictions a reliable signal, and we'd finally have better information about what the weather is going to do.
I think one part I must be missing is why so many people are assuming that the primary user of prediction markets would be gamblers instead of specialists, especially once they operated at scale. I just don't see why that would happen. Anywhere there's an opportunity to make money reliably by coming up with better analysis or prediction tools, capital will flock there and incentivize coming up with better analysis or prediction tools.
I think I really would like to live in a world where that was highly incentivized, and I'm confused why people would not want that.
ETA: I don't think the gamblers would ruin this any more than they ruin Wall Street. I don't think they have enough capital to matter. (They are, after all, prone to losing money.)
I thought the reason prediction markets were useful was not that people with inside information participate in them which can provide an indicator to the rest of us, but that by providing a sense of consensus at scale we can more accurately predict things.
e.g. two sports teams participating in a fair match tomorrow, someone runs a book and after 200,000 punters bet, the odds are 90/10 in favour of Team A indicates that 90% of the time Team A is going to win that game.
This assumes perfect and fully available information with punters availing themselves of this info (or at least an equal split of passionate/casual/informed/wreckless or even slightly "inside" punters on each side).
Ironically, I actually have a philosophy degree. If I'm still missing the point, I really don't think it's because I haven't learned how to think.
All I can really do in this case is ask for explanation. If you're enough higher and mightier than I am that you don't care to give me one, that's fine. You don't have to. It's just kind of...unnecessarily condescending to rub my face in it without even trying?
One of the problems is that by creating a prediction market for your death, you may be creating a hit for yourself.
You enable different enemies to crowdsource for your bounty, and as soon as it is deemed worthy by a hitman, they might take up on the job by placing the opposite bet.
It's a very specific example but the mechanics work for most events in a similar fashion.
It is for this reason that event creation is not open to the public, but rather handled by the regulated markets themselves
The interesting thing to me about this example is that it had to be someone lower level in or near the administration with less wealth, but who knew about a military operation. Hard to imagine any of the rich people around him risking a bet for such a small sum.
I'm trying to understand what the criticism is here, because the example seems to support the point that these are meant to be a way of learning the future, not oppose it. I thought the whole point was that yes, people with inside knowledge will bet large sums of money on things they expect to happen, and that's what makes the prediction useful. The market is meant to incentivize people who know things to act on them in a way that makes them known.
If I knew someone wanted me dead, of course I would want a prediction market on it, and if the odds suddenly shifted dramatically in favor of my death, I would use that as a trigger for whatever defense strategies I had in place. Someone has really good reason to bet a lot of money on the prospect that I'm about to die. It's probably someone who knows of an active plot in motion to try to kill me! The sooner I can find out about that, the better. I would much rather give them an incentive to make that known somewhat earlier than wait.
I feel like there must be some big piece of this puzzle that I'm missing that makes it so these cannot operate the way I imagine them, but I haven't heard anyone explaining what it is. Someone fill me in on what I'm missing here?