I just mean to say that Dennett denies that there is anything that is "ineffable, intrinsic, private, [and] directly or immediately apprehensible in consciousness". But my point is that this is a particular philosophical term whose existence and nature is being disputed, and that this is being done on philosophical grounds.
>Yes, I know that's the idea. But you can't get past the anthropic principle.
Well, the anthropic principle is more relevant for fine-tuning arguments, the question here is more whether or not there can be brute facts, but that aside, my contention is just that this dispute is not one that science adjudicates.
>Actually, scientists don't spend a lot of time debunking flat-earthers.
I mean, sure, because the scientific arguments for the roundness of the earth have been laid out and there's not much more left to say, but cases don't generally get so neatly closed in philosophy.
All of this is really just to say that there are areas of discussion where it's philosophy rather than science that has to be our instrument for adjudicating disputes. Maybe this area of discussion isn't interesting to you, but that's fine, not every subject in academia has to be interesting to you.
> the question here is more whether or not there can be brute facts
That depends on what you mean by "brute fact". Can you give me an example of one?
> there are areas of discussion where it's philosophy rather than science that has to be our instrument for adjudicating disputes
And I dispute that, and I believe I can support my position by refuting that very claim with science. If it is true that there exist "areas of discussion where it's philosophy rather than science that has to be our instrument for adjudicating disputes" then you should be able to give an example of such an area of discussion, and I predict that you can't.
BTW, I would like nothing better than for you to actually prove me wrong about this. But I've thought about this for a very long time and posed this challenge to a lot of people. If you succeed, you will be the first.
OK, I'd like nothing better than for you to show me that there's no such area.
Since we're talking about contingency...
I'll just lay out a version of the argument from contingency:
1. A contingent being (a being such that if it exists, it could have not-existed) exists.
2. All contingent beings have a sufficient cause of or fully adequate explanation for their existence.
3. The sufficient cause of or fully adequate explanation for the existence of contingent beings is something other than the contingent being itself.
4. The sufficient cause of or fully adequate explanation for the existence of contingent beings must either be solely other contingent beings or include a non-contingent (necessary) being.
5. Contingent beings alone cannot provide a sufficient cause of or fully adequate explanation for the existence of contingent beings.
6. Therefore, what sufficiently causes or fully adequately explains the existence of contingent beings must include a non-contingent (necessary) being.
7. Therefore, a necessary being (a being such that if it exists, it cannot not-exist) exists.
8. The universe, which is composed of only contingent beings, is contingent.
9. Therefore, the necessary being is something other than the universe.
I'd like you to tell me what premise you deny, and why you deny this premise on purely scientific grounds.
But I will also happily concede that something other than the universe exists. Quantum fields exist and they are not part of the universe. (However, I do not concede that quantum fields are non-contingent. They may or may not be, we simply don't know. There could be an infinite hierarchy of causation.)
For one, this isn't an ontological argument, this is a version of the cosmological argument.
I mean, I'm not even concerned about the truth or falsity of the conclusion of this argument. I posed this argument to you, and right away, we've started talking about ontological categories and what it means for something to exist. Have we not already started doing philosophy? Wasn't this supposed to be a purely scientific discussion?
> For one, this isn't an ontological argument, this is a version of the cosmological argument.
Potato, potahto.
> Have we not already started doing philosophy?
No. Establishing the meanings of words is part of science. You should read chapter 7 of David Deutsch's "The Fabric of Reality" and pay particular attention to the part where he says, "Languages are theories."
I mean, talking about what things exist, and what things don't, and what it means for something to exist are things that philosophers do as part of philosophy (specifically ontology). I suppose there's nothing wrong with Deutsch's characterization, I guess we can just call the philosophers who, in doing philosophy, discuss the meanings of words (like what it means to exist or, as Dennett and many other philosophers have, what it means to have free will, or all kinds of other terms) scientists who are actually doing science. If we use the terms this way, the academic discipline of philosophy seems perfectly justified since it's actually secretly scientific (they just don't know it themselves!).
But maybe more seriously (and hopefully more fruitfully), I should ask, according to Deutsch's/your characterization, what would count as doing philosophy as opposed to doing science? I would normally say "the things that academic philosophers do as part of their discipline", but it looks like that definition isn't going to stand.
I just mean to say that Dennett denies that there is anything that is "ineffable, intrinsic, private, [and] directly or immediately apprehensible in consciousness". But my point is that this is a particular philosophical term whose existence and nature is being disputed, and that this is being done on philosophical grounds.
>Yes, I know that's the idea. But you can't get past the anthropic principle.
Well, the anthropic principle is more relevant for fine-tuning arguments, the question here is more whether or not there can be brute facts, but that aside, my contention is just that this dispute is not one that science adjudicates.
>Actually, scientists don't spend a lot of time debunking flat-earthers.
I mean, sure, because the scientific arguments for the roundness of the earth have been laid out and there's not much more left to say, but cases don't generally get so neatly closed in philosophy.
All of this is really just to say that there are areas of discussion where it's philosophy rather than science that has to be our instrument for adjudicating disputes. Maybe this area of discussion isn't interesting to you, but that's fine, not every subject in academia has to be interesting to you.